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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee, 
vs. 
TROY N. PASSEY, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 920267-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2)(d) ("...appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court.") 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court clearly erroneous in its ruling that even though it found 
there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Passey, the case against him would not be 
dismissed? 
2. Was the trial court clearly erroneous in ruling that the blood test results 
obtained from Mr. Passey would be admitted into evidence in light of the fact that it 
found there was no probable cause to arrest? 
4. Was the trial court clearly erroneous in finding that Mr. Passey's submission to 
the blood test was voluntary, in light of the court's ruling that his arrest was made 
without probable cause? 
5 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference and are to be reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255,1258, and n.5 
(Utah 1987). Questions of law are to be reviewed by this court for correctness. Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are at issue in this case: 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Passey was charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44 
(Supp. 1990). 
On the 24th day of January, 1992, counsel for Mr. Passey filed a Motion and 
Memorandum to Dismiss on the Grounds of No Probable Cause to Arrest and a Motion 
to Suppress Blood Test Results. (Copies of the Motion To Dismiss and Motion to 
Suppress are contained in Appendix 1 to this brief.) (A copy of the relevant portions of 
the transcript [hereinafter referred to a T.] is contained in Appendix 2). 
An evidentiary hearing was held to address these motions and issues on the 14th 
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day of February, 1992. At that time the trial court found that there was no probable 
cause to arrest, yet denied all defense motions and failed to dismiss the case. 
The trial was held on the 6th day of March, 1992, at which time Mr. Passey 
entered a plea of nolo contendere conditional upon Mr. Passey appealing the the trial 
court's failure to dismiss the case after ruling that there was no probable cause to arrest 
and failure to suppress the blood test results into evidence upon ruling that there was no 
probable cause for the arrest. The trial court sentenced Mr. Passey conditional upon 
this Court's findings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the 14th day of February, 1992. At which 
time the trial court heard evidence and arguments concerning defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on the Grounds of No Probable Cause to Arrest. 
Trooper David Popelmayer of the Utah Highway Patrol was called as a witness 
by the prosecution. Upon cross examination he testified that he had no contact with Mr. 
Passey prior to his being placed in the ambulance, at which time he allegedly smelled 
an odor of alcohol while standing at the foot of the ambulance. (T. 13-14) At that time, 
based only on an odor of alcohol which he could not identify, he formulated the opinion 
that Mr. Passey was under the influence of alcohol. (T. 15) 
Trooper Hogan of the Utah Highway Patrol was then called as a witness by the 
prosecution. At that time he testified that when he arrived at the hospital he 
immediately placed Mr. Passey under arrest and did not speak to him until he requested 
that Mr. Passey submit to a blood test. (T. 19) 
After arguments by respective counsel on the issue of probable cause to arrest, 
the trial court ruled that, 
...there was not probable cause for an arrest, simply upon the basis of an 
accident together with an odor of alcohol. So let's see if the Court of Appeals 
agrees with me or not, but I think odor and accident is insufficient.... (T. 39) 
However, the court did not dismiss the case, but instead continued with the proceedings 
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and ruled that the blood test results could be allowed into evidence even though they 
were obtained after the illegal arrest, and after Trooper Hogan threatened him with the 
loss of his license for a year if he didn't submit. 
Testimony and arguments were also heard relating to defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Blood Test Results. Trooper Popelmayer testified that he asked Trooper 
Hogan to go to the hospital, place Mr. Passey under arrest and witness the 
administration of the blood test. (T.11 -12) Trooper Popelmayer had no further contact 
with Mr. Passey. 
Trooper Hogan testified that upon arriving at the hospital, Mr. Passey was being 
tended to by the doctors. When given the opportunity, he placed Mr. Passey under 
arrest and read him the ".08" admonition stating that if he refused to submit to the test 
he could lose his license for a year. He then witnessed the blood draw as requested, 
read Mr. Passey his Miranda rights, wrote up a citation for driving under the influence 
and left. Respective counsel then argued the motion at which time the trial court denied 
the Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Numerous cases in other jurisdictions, with similar factual situations, have been 
dismissed based on the lack of probable cause to arrest. In the instant case, it was 
clearly within the trial court's discretion to dismiss the case against Mr. Passey after 
ruling that there was no probable cause to arrest, regardless of whether or not the blood 
test results were properly obtained as the blood test results were obtained subsequent 
to the illegal arrest and were therefore invalid. 
Additionally, with respect to the administration of the blood test, the reading of 
the ".08" admonition prior to having Mr. Passey submit to the blood test was coercive in 
nature as he may not have submitted to the test had he not been threatened with losing 
his driver's license for the period of one year. Further, he was under the care of 
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physicians at the time, having been involved in a serious accident, and may not have 
been able to make an informed consent. Therefore, the blood test was not submitted to 
voluntarily as the trial court found, but was forced to oblige, or lose his driving privileges. 
Further, due to the fact that the blood test was obtained after the illegal arrest, it is 
invalid and should not have been allowed into evidence by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
The issues before this Court are clearly ones of propriety. There is little question 
that the trial court was unwilling to dismiss this matter, even though it was found that 
there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Passey, and that the trial court had the power 
to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
states in pertinent part that, 
"In its discretion, for substantial cause and in the 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own 
initiative or upon application of either party, order 
an information or indictment dismissed." (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, it is now the burden of this Court to decide whether the case should have 
been dismissed, and if so to remand it back to the trial court so that it may follow 
through on its responsibility. 
I. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE 
While there is no statutory requirement that a court dismiss a case, it is 
presumed that if the facts of the case do not justify a conviction, the case should be, 
and is in most cases, dismissed. Courts in this and other jurisdictions have found that 
there was no probable cause to arrest, yet have subsequently dismissed or remanded 
their respective cases for dismissal. 
In State v. Monterrubio. 523 N.E.2d 521 (Utah 1987), the defendant was arrested 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. The only evidence the arresting officer had to 
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establish probable cause, as in the instant case, was an odor of alcohol. Based upon 
that evidence the court stated that, "The court finds a lack of probable cause for the 
arrest and...The charges against the defendant are dismissed." Id. at 362. 
(Emphasis added) 
Additionally, in State v. Bullock. 388 N.W.2d 505 (Neb. 1986), the Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that, 
"The evidence before the trial court was not sufficient to 
support a finding of guilty on this issue. Defendant's 
conviction is reversed and the cause remanded with 
directions to dismiss the complaint." Id. at 509. 
Therefore, while the trial court is not statutorily required to dismiss the case against Mr. 
Passey, it should be required to dismiss the case based on the holdings of other courts 
in similar cases, as well as controlling case law presented above. 
II- BLOOD TEST RESULTS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO 
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
The second point is that of whether the officer in the instant case had grounds to 
request that Mr. Passey submit to the test as there was no probable cause to arrest. 
Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44.10 (a, b), Utah Code Annotated (1953), states in 
pertinent part that an officer may request that a person submit to a blood test only if the 
officer "...[has] grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle...while under the influence of alcohol." The trial court 
in the instant case held that "...the arrest per se is without probable cause..." (T. 38). 
Therefore, there were no grounds for the admission of the blood test results. 
Other courts have ruled favorably on this issue as well. In State v. I.. R.L. A 
Person Under Eighteen Years of Age. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), this Court held 
that, 
State can rely on motorist's implied consent in order 
to administer blood test without warrant, only if it has 
probable cause to believe that motorist is guilty of 
DWI driving... Jd. at 1124. (Emphasis added) 
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In People vs. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1984), the Supreme Court, Neighbors, 
J., held that, 
...constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable 
searches and seizures require only that there be 
probable cause to place a defendant under arrest 
before a blood sample is taken... Id. at 1192. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Additionally, if there was no probable cause for the arrest in the instant case then 
it holds that there could be no implied consent and the blood test should not have been 
administered. This Court addressed this issue in State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 
1968), stating, 
Under implied consent law, implied consent of 
persons operating motor vehicles to submit to 
chemical tests for purpose of determining alcohol 
content of their blood arises only on arrest.... Id. at 
307. (Emphasis added) 
As the arrest in the instant case was clearly illegal due to the lack of probable cause, 
there could be no implied consent and no test should have been administered. 
HI- WAS BLOOD TEST CONSENT VOLUNTARY 
The final issue before this Court is that of whether or not the trial court's finding 
that Mr. Passey's consent to the blood test was voluntary was clearly erroneous, and if 
so, was he the victim of coercion by the arresting officer by his reading of the ".08 
admonition" to Mr. Passey prior to the administration of the blood test. 
The ".08 admonition" states, 
Results indicating .08 grams or more by weight of 
alcohol in your blood/breath shall, and the existence 
of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs 
sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of 
your license of privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(T.37) (Emphasis added) 
By definition, the ".08 admonition" is coercive in nature. It placed Mr. Passey in a 
precarious position. Either he submit to the test or be in danger of losing his driving 
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privilege for as much as a year. Therefore, he really had no choice but to submit to the 
test or suffer the consequences. As a result, the consent was not voluntary as the trial 
court found, due to the coercive language in the ".08 admonition," and the test results 
should not have been allowed into evidence. 
Further, this Court held, in State v. L R . L A Person Under Eighteen Years of 
Age, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), that the, 
Purpose of implied consent law is to avoid violence 
which often attends attempts to forcibly test 
recalcitrant drivers, by enabling officers to use 
threat of potential license suspension to persuade 
drivers to submit to blood test. (Emphasis added) 
While there was little chance of violence in the instant case as Mr. Passey was injured 
and being tended to by the doctors at the hospital, there is no doubt that the ".08" 
admonition" was threatening and coercive in nature, thereby rendering the consent 
involuntary and inadmissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, it was the responsibility of the trial court to dismiss the case against Mr. 
Passey at the time of the evidentiary hearing based on its finding that there was no 
probable cause to arrest him. However, as that responsibility was not carried out, it is 
now the burden of this court, based upon the facts in the instant case, as well as 
documented case law and the holdings of this and other courts, to reverse the trial 
court's findings. In the alternative, this court should remand this case back to the trial 
court with instructions to proceed, but not to admit the results of the blood test, on the 
grounds that they are inadmissible due to the coercive nature of their seizure, violating 
the defendant's rights under both the federal and state constitutions, and remand this 
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case to the trial court for the purpose of dismissing the case against Mr. Passey. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Larry Long, hereby certify that eight copies of the foregoing will be sent to the 
Utah Court of Appeals and that four copies of the foregoing will be sent to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's office at 2002 South State, #S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190, this 
1 st day of September, 1992. 
MAILED by C^f/J \JCYrlt+j this 1st day of September, 1992 
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L. Long #1989 
Lawyer for Defendant 
39 Exchange Place #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
(801) 583-9207 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
TROY N. PASSEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND 
OF NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
ARREST 
Case no. 912014290 
Hon. William A. Thorne 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through counsel of record, 
L. Long, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to dismiss this 
matter on the grounds that the arresting officer did not have 
probable cause to arrest the defendant for D.U.I.. 
STATEWrewrc1 OF FAC^SS 
Troy Passey was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol on the 22nd day of October, 1991 by Trooper Popelmayer of 
the Utah Highway Patrol. However, Trooper Popelmayer did not 
have sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to arrest 
Troy. 
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Upon arriving at the scene of an automobile accident in 
which Troy was involved, Trooper Popelmayer found the paramedics 
removing Troy from the wrecked vehicle. He states that, 
"At that time at the ambulance when they brought Mr. Passey 
up to the ambulance I did notice an odor of an alcoholic 
beverage about him. At that time I had mo more contact with 
him as the paramedics were busy working with him." (Per se 
Hearing Transcript, page 6, lines 5-9). 
There were no field coordination procedures performed, and no 
other indicia mentioned until after the arrest when Trooper 
Popelmayer spoke to Troy at the hospital and alleged that he had 
"slow-slurred" speech. (DUI Report Form, page 1, section VII, 
line 2). However, since that was not notice until after the 
arrest, it is irrelevant. Following Trooper Popelmayer's 
observation of the alleged odor of alcohol, Troy was flown by 
Life Flight to LDS Hospital where he was treated for his 
injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The odor of alcohol alone is not 
sufficient to establish probable 
cause for arrest. 
In several recent cases, most notably from the Colorado 
Supreme Court, the courts have focused on the indicia of 
intoxication necessary to constitute probable cause. In People 
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v. Roybal. 672 P.2d 1003 (Colo, 1983), the Colorado court held 
that the odor of alcohol alone is not sufficient to establish 
probable cause for a DUI arrest. In Roybal, the defendant was 
involved in a collision with another vehicle. The police officer 
testified that the defendant had an odor of alcoholic beverage 
about him, but appeared to be coherent, seemed to walk in a 
fairly normal manner,_ and didn't have any problems talking. 
Based on this set of circumstances, the Colorado Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court and held that the state had not 
established probable cause for the arrest. The court noted that 
although the officer's testimony and his decision to administer a 
blood test were suggestive of an opinion that the defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol, the only objective fact to which 
the officer testified in support of his conclusion was the odor 
of alcohol. 
If an officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe 
that an individual is under the influence of alcohol then the 
arrest should not be made. Some of the elements which may 
establish intoxication are the smell of alcohol on defendant's 
breath (State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971); Layton City v. 
Noon. 736 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Utah 1987)); slurred speech (Noon, 736 
P.2d at 1038); poor balance (Id.; Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778, 779-80 (Utah 1986)); drooling (Lopez, 720 P.2d at 779); and 
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various field coordination procedures (Noon, 736 P.2d at 1038; 
Lopez, 720 P.2d at 779-780). In combination these indicators of 
intoxication, while not exclusive, may be enough that a 
"reasonable and prudent person in [the arresting officer's] 
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." Noon, 736 P.2d at 1037. 
In the instant, case^ however, as in Roybal, the only 
objective fact that Officer Popelmayer relied on was an odor of 
alcohol. That alone is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion to justify further custodial interrogation, and 
therefore, there is no probable cause for the arrest. 
The question of whether an odor of alcohol was sufficient to 
establish probable cause was further addressed in the cases of 
State v. Monterrubio, 523 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Mun. 1987); State v. 
Cloud, 573 N.E.2d 1244 (Ohio Mun. 1991). In those cases, as in 
Roybal, the only evidence the arresting officer observed was an 
odor of alcohol. The respective Courts ruled that "testimony to 
the effect that the accused's breath smelled of alcohol is not 
alone sufficient proof that he was intoxicated." Monterrubio at 
361; and that the "police officer lacked probable cause for 
arresting defendant after he was stopped, based only upon 
suspect's appearance and odor of alcohol emanating from him." 
Cloud at 1245. 
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B. Trooper Popelmeyer had insufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause to arrest. 
Another argument which must be raised in this case, is 
whether or not, based upon the evidence, the arresting officer 
had sufficient evidence to'establish probable cause to arrest the 
defendant. In State v. Bullock, 388 N.W.2d 505 (Neb. 1986), the 
Defendant stopped for the officer and stumbled as he exited his 
vehicle. However, he then walked 20 or 30 feet to the officer's 
vehicle without any problem. Defendant did have an odor of 
alcohol, his eyes were also "red and bloodshot", and the 
arresting officer testified that while speaking to the defendant 
in his police car that the defendant's speech was "slurred and 
somewhat confused," however, when speaking to the defendant while 
he was still in his own vehicle, he did not "recall observing 
anything at that time about his speech." Bullock at 509. No 
field coordination procedures were administered either in this 
case. Therefore, based on the available evidence, the court 
ruled that "the evidence before the trial court was not 
sufficient to support a finding of guilty on this issue." 
Bullock at 509. 
The instant case does not provide even a minute amount of 
the evidence mentioned in Bullock. The only evidence the 
arresting officer had to base his arrest on was an odor of 
alcohol. If the standard applied in Bullock must be met to 
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establish probable cause, then obviously, based on the minute 
amount of evidence in the instant case, there is no showing of 
probable cause to arrest. Therefore, the case should be 
dismissed. 
C. Trooper Popelmayer did not have Probable Cause 
to Arrest Pursuant to Section 77-7-2(1) of the 
Utah Code Annotated and Mercer v. Dept of Motor 
Vehicles. 
Section 77-7-2(1) of the Utah Code Annotated states in part 
that, 
"A peace officer may make an arrest under authority 
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person for 
any offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer. . . . " 
In the instant case, Trooper Popelmayer did not witness Troy 
committing any crime or attempting to commit any crime. 
Furthermore, in Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehiclesf 280 
Cal.Rptr. 745 (Cal. 1991), the defendant was observed slumped 
over the steering wheel of the vehicle with the engine running 
and the headlights on. The police were called to the scene and 
an officer awoke the defendant who proceeded to shift the manual 
transmission as if he were already driving the vehicle even 
though it was not moving. Upon further investigation the officer 
arrested the defendant for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. However, in court the officer conceded that the 
defendant's car never moved. The case was taken to the 
California Supreme Court to decide the issue of whether an 
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officer can make a lawful arrest for DUl if the defendant vehicle 
was parked and the officer did not see the vehicle move. Upon 
analysis, the Supreme Court observed that there were two ways of 
looking at the problem. One states that the governing statutes 
require that the officer see the vehicle move, however minute the 
distance. The other is that if the defendant actively takes 
control of the vehicle to^  resume travel along a public roadway, 
"driving" is established. 
The Supreme Court held that the vehicle must move in the 
officer's presence to find a defendant guilty, (emphasis added). 
The Court further held, 
" . . . that because the statute is penal in nature it should 
be construed strictly rather than broadly. Thus, applying 
the everyday usage of the phrase "to drive a vehicle" means 
that a volitional movement of the vehicle mist: occur in the 
strictest sense." Id. 
Finally, the Court held, 
" . . . that a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is permissible 
only if a public offense occurs in the arresting officer's 
"presence," and because the officer did not see Mercer's 
vehicle move, we conclude Mercer was not "lawfully arrested" 
. . . ." Id. at 745, 755. 
In the instant case we have the same circumstances as in 
Mercer, Troy was not in the vehicle at the time Trooper 
Popelmayer arrived at the scene, the vehicle was parked, the 
engine was off, and Trooper Popelmayer did not at any time see 
the vehicle move on its own or under Troy's control. Therefore, 
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Troy's arrest was unlawful and must be dismissed as a matter of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence Trooper Popelmayer had t base his arrest 
on in this matter was an odor of alcohol. There were no field 
coordination procedures and Trooper Popelmayer did not witness 
the crime being committed by the Defendant. Therefore, as shown 
by the arguments and cases outlined above, no probable cause for 
arrest existed in this matter. Subsequently, the case should be 
dismissed as a matter of law. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the Court: 
1. Dismiss this matter on the grounds that Officer Popelmayer 
did not have probable cause to arrest Troy for DUI and any 
evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible; 
2. Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure which states in pertinent part, 
"A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial 
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record." 
The defendant therefore prays that since factual issues are 
involved in determining this motion that the Court state its 
findings on the record; and, 
8 
3. Order such other relief as may be deemed appropriate and 
proper in the premises. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £Z_ (lay of January, 1992. 
Lawyer foirDefendafnt 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the a I%ay of January, 1992, I personally 
delivered//##3^ ted a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Defendant's Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss on the Grounds of No 
Probable Cause to Arrest to the following: 
Clerk of the Court 
Third Circuit Court 
3636 South Constitution Blvd 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Troy Passey 
4760 South 2200 West #7 
West Valley City, Utah 84118 
/ fc^ £ (jjJM> 
10 
L. Long, #1989 
Lawyer for Defendant 
39 Exchange Place, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
(801) 583-9207 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BLOOD TEST RESULTS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No. 912014290 
TROY N. PASSEY, : Hon. William A. Thorne 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, by and through counsel of record, L. Long, moves 
this Court for an order suppressing any and all evidence seized 
or obtained as a result of illegal acts on behalf of the 
plaintiff in this action which violated the defendants rights as 
guaranteed under both the Federal and State Constitutions and 
under state statutes. The grounds for this motion are as 
follows: 
ST^TEHEWT OF PACTS 
Troy Passey was involved in an automobile accident on the 
27th day of October, 1991. Troopers Popelmayer and Hogan were 
the officers on the scene. Troy was taken to LDS hospital by 
Life Flight. Trooper Popelmayer asked Trooper Hogan to go to LDS 
1 
hospital to arrest Troy f driving under the it i.e*.* * • f 
alcohol and witness ;: r , : i, ; imayer 
ii'iiiijld HMI i.i., : . probable cause . • arrest -s t?,e \ / evidence 
he had t.o re f. • +:>: .:* • «• ^  • t 1,0;^, . Trooper Hogan 
agreed and proceede i nn 
<;:.-!-. nu rtt - J « hospital, howevei , al 
the hospital. Trooper .hogan states thav ' ' did no I. hi.wewor smell 
an diet J t-hp^  ha i i . oxygen 
mask ^T f. < : .* * ime sc • - >,. i not -nell his - rt-^ T » ' ^ei 
'i Hearing Transcript, page iu, iineb 4 
Hnq.iri !iirin| rihtu i i ui *> i /idence no probable cause, and no 
search warrant, to re:':. •-.. hi:- irrest and subsequent request 
ot Troy t i. submit t* a UXUL : '-.-' *on-1m« , tin H »( and test 
result', M f.-tf" i I.log a. y obtained *-• : should be suppressed as a 
matter ol hiw. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the lawfulness 
of a warrantless search and seizure, Coolridge v» New Hampshi, re, 
4 0'.} U.S. 44 1 irr'M, ,i. I ll ,( n1 .,, I'lrqi^ ] statements or acts of 
I I if defendant which were the products M custodial interrogation 
meet the?! requisites of Miranda v. Arizona IH/I i n •. i i *#*•>*.) 
and Minnick v . Mississipp . u^p.t ' , 4 8<> { . JV , 
2 
2. Any statements allegedly attributed to the defendant 
were made as a result of illegal custodial interrogation, without 
proper warning, Miranda v. Arizona, Id.; Minnick v. Mississippif 
Id.; and absent any public safety exception. New York v. 
Quarles. 104 S.CT. 2626 (1984). 
3. Any statements or acts allegedly attributed to the 
defendant were made^ as ^.result of illegal custodial 
interrogation and made without a knowing, intelligent and 
affirmative waiver by the defendant of his rights to remain 
silent and to counsel, Miranda v. Arizonar ibid., Minnick v. 
Mississippi, ibid, and were obtained in violation of Amendments 5 
and 9 of the U.S. Constitution. 
4. The defendant was not afforded meaningful access to 
counsel at a time when critical decisions involving his 
constitutional and statutory rights were being made. U.S. v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
5. The defendant, not having waived any constitutional or 
statutory rights, is guaranteed that such unconstitutional and 
nonstatutory extrajudicial statements, acts, admissions or 
confessions alleged to have been made, will be suppressed. 
Minnick V. Mississippif ibid.; Edwards v. Arizona, ibid.; Miranda 
v. Arizona, ibid.; Jackson v. Denno, 378 US. 368 (1964); Wong Sun 
v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohior 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3 
6. m ^ icquisiticr *f !r e evidence which the plaintiff 
will offer » <-3 t ^ ^  ;Mde without " ',< ;1*--1 ei.da:.t " . «ii.scii"" 
7. 1; * i.pt^ l 1 igontly, voluntarily and 
knowingly consent i M.r taking os • -, -jlood specimen, or z) 
field ^oordinatic k Loceau- ^  
:efendant di d not receive requisite statutory 
warnings witt regard -to—saction 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as Amended « .*..i:im't ^ * hemical 
t- , , . m a t -HhK defendant was informed both orally i in 
writing that .> * . v refuse t ^vc a JJJX 3< 
admissi i:i« • : in anw criminal and/or civil 
action i defendant'J diiver':- license could be suspended 
: • r refuses * - n -^ blood spec^ "t \\v.\ I M • i:. prosecuted; 
< . >
 t. - . - ., . , •• hearing within 30 
days after the incident to determine if his license would t e 
suspended. 
9. '. * .i *o" b" the defendant, as well as any 
test resul* derivat i \ * * .tw enforcement violations ot I hf» 
defendant * * t^ uu ix mu easuii.ibie searches and 
i 1 custodial interrogation : iqtv t assistance of 
counsel, and right ,; ^w<- voluntary consent. 
: V* •• • <• - - • •o/.ieo. as per 41!-6- 44 1 0 of 
1 :«. - v.,;.. -..w'.. . i.-; right to tan* ;s own test _^  uAo arresting 
officer. Moreover, the arresting officer, having knowledge of 
the defendant's right to his own chemical test, intentionally and 
deliberately failed to inform the defendant of this right. Said 
intentional and deliberate failure by the plaintiff violated the 
defendant's federal and state constitutional rights to due 
process of law in that he is now precluded from the opportunity 
of presenting material ^ scientific evidence of alcohol 
concentration, or lack thereof, at the time of the alleged 
offense. Said material evidence could have conclusively 
established the innocence of the defendant. 
11. Only a single blood specimen for alcohol concentration 
was taken of the defendant, and as such, is not either a reliable 
or relevant indicator of intoxication at the time of the alleged 
offense. A result of one test is not indicative of whether the 
alcohol concentration was declining, rising or peaked. 
Accordingly, said test result is inadmissible as per Utah R. 
Evid. 401-403. Moreover, said evidence must be excluded because 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, as the same would confuse the issues and tend 
to mislead the fact finder. 
12. Whether the blood alcohol analysis was performed by 
using improperly compounded chemicals. Cf., Cody v. State, 548 
5 
S - W. 2d 401 (Tex. Ci; ,. Af»\>• 19 ) ; Palafox v. State , 509 S . W• 2d 846 
(Tex.Cr.App. I 97 4 ) , 
1 i wIiet„het the spectrometer used 4~ the blood alcohol 
analysis of the blood specimen taken from \ he defendant was i lot • 
under reasonable per i < nl i«• euperv i s t • i " '"ic who has an 
understanding of the scientific theory of the machine. 
J 4 Pursuant --to- the Court's n ;il Incf in People jv Sutherl and, 
683 P.2d MM? M 1 In. I fi'ni „ IIICM' W,I(; no! probable cause to 
arrest Troy in tlue matter, nor were there exigent circumstances 
which would allow Trooper Hogan to obtain i bh,.jii feel I • or Troy 
wi thout s IL si-; • • Therefore, the taking of Troy's blood 
specimen was . neqol ae Trooper Hogan had Hie responsibility to 
obtai! search warrant pi mi h I lu le-,1 M unin w i,-» obtained. 
I , ' he test, it so It and l.ht Lest results should be • 
suppressed, 
CONCLUSION 
Vreiii Hie evidence and arguments presented above it is clear 
that Troy's blood test .and subsequent test results were el it', i . ned 
illegal! • There w.e" mi pinbyble eaueo in arrest, no exigent 
r.i rcumstances, and, > search warrant obtained prior to the test* 
Furthermore i-< blood test itself may not have been imi I or mod 
aiie * * > . . . not afforded access to 
counsel prior to having the test taken. Therefore, the blood 
test and test results should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Because of the foregoing reasons and others which may be 
adduced upon a hearing of this matter, the admission of the blood 
test or test results of the defendant would violate the 
defendant's statutory and constitutional guarantees (1) against 
self-incrimination,. UL.S^ -jConst. , Amendments IV, V and XIV; Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Sections 12 and 14; (2) against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Utah 
Const., Art. 1, Section 14; (3) to effective assistance of 
counsel, U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12; and (4) to his statutory rights under Article 1 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and section 41-6-44 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the Court: 
1. Instruct the prosecutor and all plaintiff's witnesses 
not to refer, testify or in any manner allude to oral or written 
statements allegedly made by the defendant or any chemical test 
or test results of Defendant's blood until their admissibility 
has been determined; 
2. Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure which states in pertinent part, 
7 
11A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial 
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for alter determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record." 
The defendant therefore prays that since factual issues will 
arise in this natter, this Ouui t ^i\Un \\\, finflinqs • m I.he 
t v.cor il, .-md, 
Order such ..other relief as may De deemed appropr i .'i to 
and proper in the premises. 
DATED this ffi' day of January, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the of January, 1992, I personally 
m^Ll^d/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion 
to Suppress the Blood Test Results to the following: 
Clerk of the Court 
Third Circuit Court 
3636 South Constitution Blvd 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Troy Passey 
4760 South 2200 West #7 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
-0O0-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TROY N. PASSEY, 
Defendant. 















BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of February, 
1992, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: MR. KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #3500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
For the Defendant: MR. LARRY LONG 
Attorney at Law 
39 East Exchange Place, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 




























State of Utah vs. Troy N. Passey 
WITNESSES FOR THE STATE 
DAVID POPELMAYER 
Direct Examination by Mr. Updegrove 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Long 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Updegrove 
LARRY HOGAN 
Direct Examination by Mr. Updegrove 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Long 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Updegrove 
Recross-Examination by Mr. Long 
STATE RESTS 
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. LONG 
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. UPDEGROVE 













ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
365 BRAHMA ORIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We have State of Utah vs. j 
Troy Passey, Is Mr. Passey here? Okay. \ 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'll get Larry, i 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, are you ready to j 
go forward with this? . 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, your Honor. Kenneth j 
Updegrove for the State. '; 
MR. LONG: Larry Long for the defendant. ! 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Long, it's your j 
i 
motion. What-- i 
t 
MR. LONG: Well, there are several motions j 
involved. Do you think it would pay us to sort them out and I 
maybe deal with them a category at a time? be 
handle some of these quite summarily. 
Or we could start with the evidentiary ; 
hearing, I think the critical part of that is the motion in ! 
limine--
THE COURT: Let's do the evidentiary I 
heaj . , then we can have—let the witnesses be on their way 
or they can stay and watch, if they want, but let's not hold 
them here unnecessarily. 
MR. LONG: A l l r i g h t . I have p r e p a r e d a j 
2 
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supplemental memo. May I approach the bench? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, in the interest) 
of judicial economy, why don't I just put on my officer and 
start it. 
THE COURT: That sounds like a good way to 
I 
do it. !• 
i 
MR. UPDEGROVE: C a l l , l e t ' s s e e , i t was j 
i i 
Dave Popemayer that was the trooper. j 
THE COURT: Trooper, do you want to come 
up, please, and raise your right hand. 
DAVID POPELMAYER, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the witnessj 
stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
(Whereupon, the Court handled an unrelated matter.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, back on the 
Passey matter. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thanks, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Would you please state your name and spell your last 
A David Popelmayer, P-o-p-e-l-m-a-y-e-r. 
Q By whom are you employed, sir? 
3 
name? 
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A The Utah Highway Patrol. 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, may we invoke the 
exclusionary rule? I just noticed there's another officer in 
the courtroom, and perhaps--
THE COURT: Is that—were you part of the 
stop? 
the stop. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, he was no part of 
i 
UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Well, I was— j 
i 
MR. UPDEGROVE: He witnessed the blood j 
i 
draw. ! 
MR. LONG: The whole question is critical 
in terms of what the officers saw and observed. 
THE COURT: Well, I've heard that before, 
Mr, Long, and I don't know that--I don't know that f c m t-ake 
your word for that. 
MR. LONG: Well, I mean- -
THE COURT: You've told me something was 
critical; if I remember right, it was Ms. McGregor's testimony-
MR. LONG: Uh huh, I remember that. 
THE COURT: --and that she needed . be 
excluded, but she didn't testify to any facts other than how 
the machine worked. 
MR. LONG: Wei ] , that's par: t's tr ue , but 
my experience has been, especially with Ms. McGregor, she 
4 
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sits here and listens to what the testimony of the officers 
is and then she--her whole examination when she gets on the 
stand is — 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, if—to 
accommodate Mr. Long, you want the other officer to wait 
outside, that's fine; but I'm not going to order him out. 
Go ahead. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Updegrove) How long have you been with the 
Highway Patrol? 
A It will be eight years in August. 
Q And are you a Category One peace officer? 
A Yes. I am. 
Q And the normal training in--at POST and after 
training you receive each year? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what are your duties, sir? 
A To enforce the laws of the State of Utah, to 
investigate accidents, to handle any kind of criminal 
incident. 
Q And please, for just a minute or so, go into your 
training in accident investigation. 
A I've had the basic accident investigation course, 
I've had a couple of refresher courses, as far as accident 
investigation is concerned. 
5 
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Q - And how many accidents have you investigated, 
approximately? 
A Oh, in seven-and-a-half years, well over a thousand. 
Q All right, sir. Were you on duty in the evening of 
the 27th of October of 1991? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q Did you happen to be dispatched to SR-215 west of 
approximately 4400 South? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q Is that location in Salt Lake County? 
A It is. 
Q What did you find there, sir? 
A I—when I arrived, I observed a blue pickup truck 
that was in the culvert that would be just west of 1-215. 
Q And how did that truck get there, sir? 
A From the marks that were on the grass, the weeds, 
and also the—the damage that was in the path of this vehicle, 
I observed that that vehicle had to have come from southbound 
on 1-215 and then went off the right side of the road. 
Q Did you file an accident report? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Would you please go to the board and draw the scene 
as you saw it? 
A This will not be to scale. 
What there is is, there's a right-hand emergency 
6 
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lane here, and then this_ represents the edge of the concrete. 
There is a culvert, a cement culvert that sits off the side 
of the road, with a chainlink fence that runs—runs down and 
then there1s a gate that is right here and it runs down, 
continues on down this way. 
There is also a four-position sign that sits off | 
the side of the rode, a four pole sign that sits off the j 
side of the road. ' 
When I arrived-- ! 
THE COURT: When you say four-pole sign— j 
THE WITNESS: Highway— j 
THE COURT: You mean highway information 
sign or a billboard? 
THE WITNESS: —road sign, yes. No, it was 
a highway information sign. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: The creek or the canal runs 
off at somewhat of an angle to this, not perpendicular to the 
freeway, it runs towards an angle a bit. 
When I arrived, there was a blue pickup 
truck that was sitting down in the creek, it was on its wheels 
in the water. I observed that this part of the chainlink 
fence and a portion of this part had been damaged. I also 
observed that one of the legs on the four-legged sign had been 
damaged also. 
7 
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There were marks in the grass and in the 
similar to this right here. 
THE 
or the 
COURT: And Officer, when you say the 
pole for the sign was damaged; sheared j 






















WITNESS: They're—they1re break-away 
COURT: Okay. i 
WITNESS: And it had—it had bent it 
COURT: Okay. 
WITNESS: Is what it had done. 
UPDEGROVE: Thank you. 
Updegrove) Did you conduct an investiga-
did. 







some people that were standing--there i 
when I arrived. I observed some peopli 
be north of the accident scene. I 
, asked if they were witnesses, they 
I then talked with these witnesses. 
they were just getting the driver out 
They had taken the driver from the vehicle in 
we had called LifeFlight, who--they were 
8 _ | 
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to land, there on the freeway. 
Could I stop you for a second, please? 
Did you get information from these witnesses? 
Yes. I did. J 
Did the information from the witnesses match the 
evidence at the scene? ' 
* 
Yes. It did. 
Okay. Continue. j 
Okay. As they--they got the driver out of the 
moved him to the ambulance, I approached the 





driver's license, asked for any kind of identification. 
said no. They removed a wallet from the pants that | 
ect was wearing. 
I was standing on the step of the ambulance at the 
the bottom of the subject's feet, as he was laying 




They then handed me a wallet that came out of the | 
of the individual that was laying on the gurney. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt. When 
it came out; somebody had taken it out of the pants? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did it fall out? j 
THE WITNESS: One of the ambulance 
1 took it out of the pants. 
9 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Updegrove) Was there a driver's license in 
it? 
A Yes, There was. 
Q And did the driver's license—did you observe, 
look at the driver's license? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And did the picture on the driver's license match 
the individual you saw on the gurney? 
A Yes. It did. 
Q And what was the name? 
A It was Troy N. Passey. 
Q And did you get a good look at that individual? 
A Yes. I did, as he was laying in the ambulance. 
Q And is he here in Court today? 
A Yes He is. 
Q Would you please point him out and describe what 
he's wearing? 
A He's sitting at the defense table, he's got a black 
tie, white shirt, with a gray suit coat. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the record 
reflect that the witness has identified the defendant? 
THE COURT: Record will so reflect. 
Q (By Mr. Updegrove) Now, going back to the truck, 
did you observe any other injured persons around? 
10 
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A No. 1 did not. 
Q Did you see anybody in the truck besides the 
defendant? j 
A No. I did not. j 
Q Okay. Did you make any observations of the ; 
defendant's condition? 
A When he was in the ambulance, yes, I did. 
Q And what was that, sir? j 
A Standing at the back of the ambulance, at his feet, i 
i 
I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage. j 
Q And please describe the weather conditions that day. \ 
A They--i know it was cold. I don't believe that it ! 
was snowing. But I—well, I know it was cold, I don't recall. | 
I don't have my check book here to--to decipher the-- I 
Q Did you see any other accidents in that location? 
A Pardon me? 
Q Did you see any other accidents in that location? j 
A No. 1 did not. 
Q Now, after you made your observations of the smell j 
of alcoholic beverage, what did you do then, sir? | 
A Based on the comments that--from the witnesses that j 
I had, the physical evidence that was out on the roadway, and 
also the odor of an alcoholic beverage, I then asked, and 
I don't believe—I don't remember if it was by radio or in 
person, I asked Trooper Hogan if he would go up to the \ 
11 
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hospital where Mr. Passey had been transported by LifeFlight, | 
i 
and if he would then place the subject under arrest for j 
i 
driving under the influence of alcohol and witness the blood 
d r aw. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Let's see, I believe your--when you were dispatched I 
to the scene, it was just an accident; is that right? 
A As far as I was aware, yes. 
Q Did you--
A An injury accident. 
Q And you heard some conversation through dispatch 
about LifeFlight coming in? 
A That was after I arrived at the scene. 
Q I see. So, was any other officer there when you 
arrived? 
A Yes . I b e l i e v e t h e r e was . I know I w a s n ' t t h e 
f i r s t one t h e r e . 
Q I see. And do you know who the other officer was? 
A I believe it was Trooper Allen Kaufman had arrived 
first, and he had Trooper Robin Wilkins, who was in the same 
vehicle, riding with him. 
Q Robin Williams? 
12 
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A Wilkins. 
Q WiIkins. 
And did they leave subsequently, then, o r — 
A Some time after, yes. I'm not exactly sure when 
they left. 
Q They were not involved in investigating the 
accident o r — 
A No. They were not. 
Q You were in charge? 
A I was--I was the graveyard car that night, and they 
were in the process of going off duty. 
Q And you--that makes you in charge of the accident 
investigation? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q Okay. And when you arrived, there paramedics were 
already there, apparently? 
A Yes. They were. 
Q I see. And they were working, trying to get 
Mr. Passey out of the car? 
A Yes, they were. When I arrived. 
Q Okay. And so you had no contact with him until he 
was in the ambulance; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And when he was in the ambulance, you smelled an 
odor of alcohol? 
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A It would have been alcoholic beverage, yes. 
Q I see. And you were at the door of the ambulance? 
A Correct. 
Q And you were at his feet? 
A Correct. 
Q And so you were approximately four or five feet 
then from his feet, when you smelled this? 
A I was--I was standing right at his feet. 
Q i see. Okay. And you--this alcoholic beverage was 













It appeared to me, yes 
thought? 
And were the paramedics worki .ng 
Not--I believe he did have some 




they were work 
This scar on his left cheek, 
of the wound? 
I would believe so. I 1m not-
articular scar is part of the 
And don't they general 
They—they use alcohol 
did at that time. 
Q 
what type 
I understand. Did you 








open wounds? 1 
i 
wounds on his j 
1 
ing on any at j 
i 


















to clean | 
i 
know if they 
paramedics 
Passey o r — 
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A No. I did not. 
Q I see. And so, was it at that point that you 
formulated an opinion in your mind that Mr. Passey was | 
definitely under the influence of an alcoholic beverage? I 
i 
A Yes. It was. j 
Q Okay. And you then sent Trooper Hogan to the \ 
i 
hospital to place Mr. Passey under arrest and ask him to-- j 
I 
ask Mr. Hogan (sic) to submit to a chemical test? | 
j j 
A I sent Trooper Hogan to ask Mr. Passey for a test, j 
yes, after he placed him under arrest. j 
Q I see. And at some point, you asked Mr. Passey what-j-
you never had a discussion with Mr. Passey until you were at 
the hospital; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Did the paramedics tell you that Mr. Passey had told 
them that he'd fallen asleep at the wheel? 
A Not that I recall, the paramedics told me that he 
had said that, not that I recall. j 
Q So, you wrote down in your DUI report form that his j 
pre-arrest statement was, I fell asleep? I 
A That was--that statement was told, I believe, after 
I had gone up to the hospital. 
Q But he already arrested when you arrived, wasn't he? 
A That is correct. J 
Q So, it really wasn't a pre-arrest statement, then? ] 
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A That is correct. 
Q So, you--you had no information from Mr. Passey as 
to a reasonable explanation for this accident other than that 
he was intoxicated; is that right? 
A I had not. spoken with Mr. Passey prior to him going 
to the hospital. 
MR. LONG: No further questions, 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, anything else? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Now, you—you went to the hospital after the--
after you were through with your investigation? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q What did you observe there, sir? 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I don1t think it 
has any relevance to the motion here today because we1re 
only talking about p::bable cause to arrest. Anything that 
happened after that is irrelevant. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Okay. I — 
THE COURT: Okay. You can step down. 
Thank you. 
Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Trooper Hogan. 
MR. LONG: I donft believe Trooper Hogan 
has anything to offer at all, because he didn't even find 
16 
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Mr, Passey until he was at the hospital, and all he did was 
arrest him. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Mr.—or Trooper Hogan is 
the one that arrested him. 
THE COURT: It's up to Mr. Updegrove, if 
he needs that to present what he believes to be probable 
cause. 
If you'd come forward and raise your right 
hand, please, sir. 
LARRY HOGAN, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Come up and have a seat, 
please. 
Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you, sir. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Would you please state your name and spell your 
last name? 
A Trooper Larry Hogan, H-o-g-a-n. 
Q And by whom are you employed, sir? 
A Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q And how long have you been so employed? 
17 
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Category One peace officer? 
Yes. I am.. 
And have you had the normal trai ning subsequent to 
) Q'V 9 
A Yes I have. 
Q Officer, 01 1 the late evening c r the T~t: L r October 
: ] ast v ear , were y < :>I i • :I::i spatched * n.b.^. Hospital? 
A Yes. i was. 
Q For what reason, sir? 
A 1'' ) w 1 I i '' i l i h l i j i l i l l ) ' : - U < . l i d t h a d 
been involved in an accident. 
Q Now, when you arrived there, what did you discove rl ' 
.. A W e 1 1 , I a s k e d t i i e i I i 1 1 s e \ 1: i e r e I I I e i n I i ^  ., i d I l a ] w a s , 
1 iad received the name from Trooper Popelmayer, and 1 .he nu. ..^  
: 11 11 e • I : i :t I I: n i • : • < : i t i t 1 i < 1 1 1 h e i nd i ^  T i d u a 1 w a s I n , and I we n t 
i • i a n d p laced the i nd i v i d u a 1 u nd e r a r r e s 1 , i < : a I 1 i " i I 1 • : 
admonition, and I v/aited for the blood technician to arrive. 
Q w 1 I < 1 1 • :»1: »s e r < r a t i o n s cl i < I y o i i m a k e a b o i 11 t h e i n d i v i d u a 1'. 
A • That he had been injured, and that 1 ic i A < i: ; x ii ider 
care i i l t h e h o s p i t a1. 
Q i i i I arrested present in 
Court today? 
A Yes ,. He is . 
Q W u u i d y o u p L u d S L ' p ' , i i i n h i in • • 111 *-i rv 1 < l--'c.«": r i b e w h a t 
- - . - J M ^ ' H CSR 
" '-*HMA DRIVE (801)266-0320 


































the defense table, the ind ividual with the 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the record 
















THE COURT: The record will so reflect. j 




you make any observations 
than that he was injured? 
No, I didnft. At the time that I 
had an oxygen mask on and he had an 
ust was under care, so I didn't talk 
ust to hear his response when I read 
LONG: 
Trooper 
what was the name 
about him 
first observed 
I. V. , and you 
to him other than 
the admonition. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you very much. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Hogan, when you arrived at 








found out where he was at? 
That's correct. 
And you immediately read him the . 
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A Tl I at:f s cor reel .-. 
Q And tl len you i mmediately read him the Miranda 
warnings? 
A No. 
Q How i o n a ^ r i m e r r o ~ t h e t i m e T-ou g a " o h i r ' hr- . 0 8 
a d m o n i t i o n ' , r , t • ' • • • • : ' : : * ru- " i r a n c i \ w^r r . -n^ ' - J 
A : . , . . . ' 
after the blood had jeen drawn before I gave him the Miranda 
:jhts and asked him if he' d answer questions . 
Q Do you remember testifyii ig in this matter at the- • 
A :..atf s ] :nown as a per se hearing back on December 10th of 
st year? 
Q Do vo-i r emember b e i n q a s k e d t ht q u e s t i o n r. - n e , IMI.1 
•J - . imoni ' , o: .' rem, e m b e r a r r e s f f n e n yo u q av e r. J m * :. • 
A I doi i , 1: i: ei fieri tber :i t I woi i] d assume :i I: « * a s t l ve sai ne 
r e s p o n s e . 
Q WeI s





s a y L 
I d o n ' t remember t h a t . 
Would t h a t be c o r r e c t ? 
We'd h a v e t o g e t t ;v- t r a n s c f i [ . 
»>:ac:t ]\ w'\.r . .-•.: i ci . 
_ : 2n___ : 
auess, in ordet: 
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Q Then you gave him the Miranda warnings and asked him 
if he would talk to you? Do you remember your response to 
that? 
A I remember his response was that he would answer 
the questions. 
Q Do you remember your response as being "After his 
responses to each one"? 
A I don ft—I do not understand your question. 
Q Well, do you remember being asked by me, "You 
definitely gave him the Miranda warnings after you gave him 
the .08 admonition?" Do you remember your response as being, 
"That1s correct"? 
A I don't—I don't recall exactly what my response was 
in the hearing. I have no reason to doubt that what you're 
saying is what I said. 
Q Did--did you have anything to do with filling out 
the DUI report form; or was that exclusively Officer—or 
Trooper Popelmayer's? 
A That was Trooper Popelmayer. 
Q But he's written down here 2235 for the Miranda 
warnings, would that be correct? 
A I give Trooper Popelmayer a little piece of paper 
out of my notebook recording the times when I, both placed 
Mr. Passey under arrest, when the blood test took place and 
when the Miranda rights were given. 
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Q And t h e b l o o d t e s t : was n o t g i v e n u n t i l 2 3 5 0 ; i s 
iaL c o r r e c t -
A I d o n 1 * k • v . T '- "r h a v e t h a t i n f r o n t o f me . 
Q W e n , t n d t ' b .:-'" " : ^ . . 4 - P ^ I i s n ' t i i o r 15 m i n u t e s , 
T
 g u e s s , a f t e r you g a v e h i : - t : - M i i a n d a w a r n i n - j s ; ' 
A 1 do no t h a v e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i n f r o n t o f m e , 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your H o n o r , Mr. I . o n g ' s 
T o t t i n g f a r t h e r a f i e l d on t h e i s s u e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e , h e ' s 
1 , 11 i n« | i 111 i i i;i i J dinj i u i i n I ng.i , i i in I 
1 MR. LONKI I YM. I I , w e ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t 
1 • o p p r e s s i o n of t h e b l o o d t e s t , and 1 t h i n k i t f s c r i t i c a l whei I 
13 _ :w ^ • • . r a : . d a w a r n i n g s . T h a t ' s my on! 1 / p n i n l I'm 
14 o r i n g i n g o u t a no t. n< , ' ! 1 . i r ~ p i t . 
15 IHh COURT: Go a h e a d . 
1G Q •• (By Mr. Long) So you d o n ' t r e a l l y k n o w , tl: ME n : ' 
1 ; :TI ,- - a n , y o u f r e - - y o u ' r e d e f i n :i t e ] y t e ] 1 i n g u s t h a t - - 1 h a t h e - -
1 . u IJ a • E; 1 i i i [ t, 11 I • E T 1 :i r a n d a w a r n :i n g s a f t e i t: 1: l e t e s t": 
I-* A That's correct. 
20 Q And n o t b e f o r e ? 
2 1 '; A I • : . • . 
22 Q I s e e . Now, when y o u t a l k e d t o - - t o Mr. P a s s e y , hi s 
23 s t a t e m e n t • - - - • ; a s l e < - : " / , ..
 t 
24 A ' r c c j . . :- . 1. 
25 Q All right. And the road conditions that ni :ht, were 
22 
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t h e y s l i p p e r y ? 
A I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h e y w e r e . 
Q W a s n ' t i t snowing? 
A I d o n ' t r e c a l l . I d o n ' t have t h e r e p o r t h e r e w i t h 
me. 
Q I s e e . 
MR. LONG: No further questions. 
THE WITNESS: I--I witnessed the blood 
draw, that was my part in the investigation. 
MR. LONG: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Very briefly, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Did Mr. Passey agree to the blood draw? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q Did he fight or hold back from it? 
A No. He did not. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Long? 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Now, do you remember me asking the question, She 
arrived about—we're talking about Pam Anderson, who took the 
blood draw; she was the person who took the blood draw? 
23 
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A ^h ^ ' s c o r r e c t . . 
Q i _ ; i n v q u e s t i ' ' • I .; : i . ' : .11 •_ * ] 5 
;;.. i iari / . 1! ! - 1 you g a v e ::: 11 * : >h i . rid a v; x 1 n . : r ' > . 
'••'ioir:!.' - your r o s i c r - e b e i n g " T h a t ' s c o r r e c t " ? 
A A p p r o x i i i . ^ i u l y . 
Q ' S o , how i s i t p o s s i b l e t h a t s h e c o u l d do a b l o o d draw! 
b e f o r e s h e g ::>t t l ler e 1 
A I d o n 1 t ui 1 d e r s t a n d y o u r q u e s t i o n , 
Q W e l l , y o u r t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e u n d e r o a t h w a s , when I 
a s k ed ;; o i 1, '"' S1: I e a i : r :i > e d a bo I 11 ] 5 in :i i I i i t e s a f t: e :i : y o I i g a * ; e 1 :i i m 
the Miranda warnings? '" And you sai d , "That *' s correct11 . 
A No. She arrived about 15 minutes after I arrived at 
tl: le I iospi tal. 
Q But my question to you under oath was--
A That was 15 minutes after I read him the admonitiu* 
tl le blood draw . 
Q ' But the question I -asked you under oath, was, "She 
W u l 111 IK::-, . 
A Wo 
r r e c 
i ,s t have} m i s u n d e r s t o o , : . I * houciht v;x m e a n t 
f : e l\o - p i t ad , app i ox una ted / . 
Upon my ;. rr i ^  a 1 )f h e ' - - • - D I t ;•• ) rmied ? a t < i v 
i i t a c t e c 
r e a d him 
I 1 1 ! 
t h e 
P a s .-
admoni ' ; -~ J xen e::i t e - l 
24 
: he r e s. 
. >t = i id 
.he 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
1 blood tech arrived, we went back into the room, drew the blood 
2 | and after the blood tech left, that's when I read Mr. Passey 
^ I the Miranda warnings. 
4 Q Now, where is this piece of paper that you turned 
5 over to Mr.—or Officer--Trooper Popelmayer, that has this 
6 time sequence on it? 
7 A You'll have to ask Trooper Popelmayer, 
8 Q I see. But it's your--you don't have any individual 
9 notes of your own that you kept? 
10 I A No, I don't. I gave Trooper Popelmayer the piece of 
paper that I wrote it down on. 
Q And so you presume that the times that he wrote on 
the DUI report form are from the information you gave him? 










A No. I didn't. 
Q And is it your testimony that—that Mr, Passey never 
refused to take the test? 
A No. He did not. 
20 I M R- LONG: No further questions. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
22 MR. UPDEGROVE: Nothing, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you. 
Any other witnesses? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Not for the State, your 
25 
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THE COUPT- Mr- l o n g , anv w i t n e s s e s / 
MR. LONG: C o a l ; w*- r, JVC * ..-* a b n e : 
w h e t h e r o r :. 
s Land. ' 
vv ; L< _L ^ •:or t t r L u t e f o arr. * : , , . . ; . : ne * 30k 1 
(Recess. 
r[-i 
MR. LONG: Back f f he Pas.-ey cas< , ye-
I • ;r after a discussion, we've decided we w i n j_e^ t and we 
wwaia jke to argue +-he matter. 
THE COERT: Oka :-:, ahea>:( _•:*•:. 
r e a l l y n o t i o n s t h a t c i i t - - ! . e r u i i i . , t h i ^ GV l ^ U i i . .it . e a i ; , 
r ' o f ] ^ - t be in r r t he m o t i o n 1 o i i ?m; s s : * \ t 1 / : ; i ' jb * : \ 
I r i l e d t : i s s a p p l e i n - ' i t .i I 
ir ! inr» ' some £idd 1 * ^  o- 1] r e s e a r c h and 
or:< 
, ^ . * - e 
:ase . c : !::nK t : : . s p r e t t y w e l l " t ie d e f : nj • i-*<? . a . on 
: ; b ^ e c t , and i ' m s u r e y o u r Honor h a s n ' t nad an o p p o i t ^ n i t ^ 
-et . L v-*. - * t 
I donE know t; w you1 "i ^ik- - o proceed 
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24 
25 
2 that. Would you--
2 THE COURT: Just go ahead and argue it. 
3 MR. LONG: Well, I think in this case, 
4 basically what we've got is the odor of alcohol, or as the 
5 officer said today, the odor of an alcoholic beverage, but he 
5 didn't seem to be able to identify what kind of an alcoholic 
7 beverage it was, and has no knowledge as to whether or not-- j 
8 THE COURT: You didn't ask him. 
9 MR. LONG: That's true, but the burden's 
IQ not on me to find out what kind of an alcoholic beverage it 
l:L was that he allegedly smelled--
22 THE COURT: Well, okay, but before you say 
13 that he can't identify something, you better--
14 MR. LONG: Well, let's say he didn't 
15 identify it then. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. LONG: And he has no knowledge as to 
28 whether or not they were using alcohol in the ambulance, which 
29 I understand is quite common to clean wounds with alcohol. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I don't have any 
2i testimony to that. And obviously, you understand an attorney's 
22 argument is not evidence of that. 
23 MR. LONG: Well, that's true. So, all we 
have basically then is the odor of alcohol and an accident 
involved, and his testimony was that he definitely came to the 
27 
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o n c l u s i on t h a t Mr. P a s s e y was under t h e i n f l u e n c e and t h a t ' s 
II: 1 Ei s • E i i I:: I1 r o o p e r I I o g a i 1 i 1 p t :: !:: 1: I E 1: I o s j : • : i t a ] t • E) p ] a c e 1 ) i m 
j e r a r r e s t f o r d r i v i n g u n d e r t h e I n f l u e n c e . , 
Kh*-: O f f i c e r lb T JH j r r i ^ e d , he d i d n ' t - no t i c 
i • : ...!-• . .: : e j a u s e o : - • 
;c+~ t h a t no w a ; in
 sn o x y c e n t e n ' • : / • n d e r s t o o d t h a f 
- -] ,T v f h^re was j u s t to witnesb the uioud uraw, winch i 
So, i - a" i .-.i# * hat : h« c^sc Lau 
r:b^ect is pretty definitive ever,,v^ > 
^JOI.J. a::- J., accident is nof pror.aJjle cause irree-t, 
especially wnen . * , * ake ir . ahr * he expianat.on wh, ; h 
.v ..«.:. , J • t-asonn o UJ explanation, and yet Off.cer--
THE COrf-'T- Vo- -ay -"-o*,*1 i^ t'i;v ^  ive
 c a s, 
. )i" ol a I foho] 
:oapjea with an iccident is n + -~ 
MR . LONG : Wei 1 , I tl i:i ril the stroi lgest 
case i s the Royball case in Colorado, thatbs the 6 ) 2 P. 2d ] 003 
THE COURT: Isn't that the one that's just 
'-~">- the odor ol cu^t,.*:!: 
Mr, ..u.v ner.,'s an accident i nvolved 
•here, * ,c . i.-elieve. kovhal! establishes that nvb: 'ement 
• • > . > • h 
jjubdLi', caa:~^.-
 t .- • :. , ' so at her cases d i e — 
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1 basically are very close, to the point, but not exactly on 
2 point, but I--I think they're all pretty persuasive that those 
3 two issues by themselves just don't quite cut the mustard for 
4 probable cause to arrest. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Updegrove? 
6 MR- UPDEGROVE: Yes, sir. We have a 
7 situation where a trained Highway Patrol Trooper, the—there 
8 is no—there are no other accidents going on at the time, 
9 indicating that there's nothing wrong with the road. I don't 
10 believe the--Trooper Hogan, of course, couldn't remember the 
11 road condition because he was at the hospital, but I believe 
12 Trooper Popelmayer said there were no real problems with the 
13 road c o n d i t i o n s . 
14 We just don't have an accident. We have 
15 somebody going off, way off to the right of the highway, 
16 knocking off part of a highway sign, going through a chain 
17 fence, and ending up in a canal next to a culvert. When an 
18 officer sees something of this nature and he smells the odor 
19 of an alcoholic beverage, he stated an alcoholic beverage. Andj 
20 he also investigated by talking to the witnesses, and the 
21 witnesses' statements were—were corroborated by the evidence 
22 he saw on the ground. 
23 When an officer or a highway patrol 
24 trooper sees something that is a significant accident, for no 
25 real particular reason that he knew at the time, 'cause he 
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1 I h a d n ' t h e a r d a n y t h i n q a b o u t t h e i n d i v i d u a l sn \ i n i I •• - I t« I I 
2 j a s l e e p b e c a u s e he h a d n ' t ; t a l k e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t at- t h e s o e i u j , 
3 | he s e e s a s i g n i f i c a n t a c e i d e n t f o r no r e a s o n and sine1 1 s o d o r 
4 1 o f an a 1 c o h o J i c b e v e r a g e , t ha f i s c e r t< i I iJ I \ / |, 1 1 , i ) J )ab 1 e c a u s e t :» 
5 ! arrest and ask for a blood sample, 
6 1 THE COURT: At what point, 
f i r I J p d e g r o ^  r e , d o e s :i t b e c on t e e i i o u g 1 I ? I i i: i • E: a i I
 r :i 
simply driven to the shoulder of the road and stopped? 
" MR. UPDEGROVE: 1 would say if he just 
:I r o \ e c • f f t : • t 1: I e s 1 I o i I J d e i o f 11 I e r o a d and ran :i n t o 11 i e b a n k 
and the officer came up there, and got the fellow out and had 
a f i e 1 d s ob r i e t y t e s t, y o u could go f roin t 1 Ie r e B i 11: I: I 31 e , 
t . l 1 « 'H " 1 - -
THE CO- PT • V c q ;,ur t h e r r , • , _ ha1. ^ 
c n e £j_eid s o b r i e ' 1 - • 
MK. 'JPDEGKt'VE: , nut ' l . •;: * , ..r. 1 " h e r e I s 
y o s s . b i l i f -y or i f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t - h e r e , b e c a u s e • u^ 
i e c j s i c n J ! t n e s c e n e . An^ ll. hi " e x p e r i e n c e , i e c a u s e < * 
i c c i d ^ n t , tc i l t . •* T tr, w i t n e s s e s Mid smei ' i na **e 
• • • * • ^ c a n a j ci L 
i , , : ue b e l i e v e s t h a t f h e r - i s p r o b a b l e -, a.:s< + , 
' e s t , I ^ - i r r e s t . He c\jr ' t d o a n y f i e l d s o o r i e ' 
. J , - .< ; o c i : i i o n a s +-r> a r r e s t i n g +-he 
* * -. ;»e ing h I t e F L i j h t ed , * ' r.w + ! • ke ^ J : j o t a* 
U l L < . J l 
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VS22S=rss5SH7 
ambulance or follow the ambulance, the individual's being 
























And because of the significant nature of 
the accident and the smell of an alcoholic beverage, I believe 
virtually any officer in this State would make the decision to ; 
arrest and ask for a blood test. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't have any 
question that what the officer did wasn't reasonable; the 
question is as to the probable cause. If all you hava is an 
accident, I'll say one that's not nearly as bad, you have an 
odor of alcohol; is that enough to make an arrest? 
If the person, for example, refuses to 
perform field sobriety tests— 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, then— 
THE COURT: — i s the odor of alcohol and 
an accident simply enough by itself? 
MR, UPDEGROVE: Well, I think it's a 
degree, your Honor, and we have to base—we have to look at 
the officer's experience and look at the degree of the 
accident. An officer, I'm sure, if he sees— 
THE COURT: Uh huh, but what does the 
degree of the accident have to do with whether he's under 
the influence? I mean, there are terrible accidents that 
don't have alcohol involved and there are terrible Dnes that 
do. 
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MR. UPDEGROVE; Well, sir, we have a single] 
c a r accident here. • • 
T H E C 0 U R T : { j j j, u l h 
MR. UPDEGROVE: We have a single car j 
I 
t 
a c c i d e n t t h a t h a. s h a p p e ne d f o r n o :j o o d i: e a s o i 1 t: 1: 1 a t: 11: 1 e o f f i c e r f 
i 
i s aw a r e o f a t t he t i in e . T he re is - -1 he roads wo u 1 d rif t cause ! 
h* accident , • hen."' no othei car :at no was aware o *~ , -• 
• * . : 
< : e ^oon una rie -•; o h . - a i c c u o l . He—he- , «t *n^t :;c nr , 
be" i o v ^ 1 h a ^ e p r o b a b l e cause 1 *-o i r r ^ s + r ~ ' i i ^ i d u a l l 
o e c a u s e ^ e ' s f OD bad J y Liriureci ,: ; l o t h i n q e l s e a t 
t h i s t i m e . 
' e x p e r i e n c e , f o r no aood r e a s o n , a 
c ; ; o a s a c c i d e n t unci - b e sn i - ' . of a i c o h o l , t:.v > f f i c e i - I roope r j 
, _ .i • pi oba iJ_e J J U S L , ci nL.* L. L•» ^ ,^ acc.i «i .*. - - J 
: go"'J r e a s o n w i t h t lie s ine. ,: a ] : oho l 
I 
a l 1 k i n d q o f f e n d e r - b e n d e r . **;. w ,* ^ c o i : - . ; i . . . i ^ s a 
s i n g l e c a r d e c i d e r ; . -:iy d i d :i t h a p p e n ? 
; Li i • C O I J R T • ID : • ] , oi i 1 la € = Ji: p * ^ : c .se ] a i 1 .1 u I 
v /ould s u p p o r t t h a t ? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: N o , s ^ r , 1 u o h h xi^v-e r i g h t } 
\/ ; :ii til: i i E te . 
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just in case your Honor 
Popelmayer radioing 
hospital, State-
does at the request 
of law enforcement, 




the one other thing I wanted to say, 
is thinking about the—Trooper 
rrooper Hogan to arrest him at the 
COURT: I've concluded that vrhat he j 
i 
Dther officers is just an extension j 
1 
thatfs—that's not the sticky point. j 
MR. 
THE 
UPDEGROVE: State v. Ramirez came out— 
COURT: There's no magic about having 
or having somebody else do it. 
MR. 
basically the argument, 
no good reason and 
cause to arrest, to 
draw and— 
blood draw? 







UPDEGROVE: But that' s — that ' s 
sir; the severity of the accident for 
smell of alcohol, that's probable 
cause he must arrest to get tie blood 
COURT: Why must you arrest to have a 
UPDEGROVE: Well, they're required to 





COURT: They can't— 
UPDEGROVE: —intoxilyzer test or a 
COURT: Why are they required to? | 
UPDEGROVE: I believe it's :.n the 
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THE COURT: I think they're allowed to, 
but why are they required to? Can't they just ask the 
person? And in this case, didn't he just simply ask the 
A I person if he wouldn't submit? 
5 MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, of course, now 
g | Trooper Popelmayer didn't get very close to the individual, he 
















alcoholic beverage. If they're going to LifeFlight an 
individual, Trooper Popelmayer, in this case, does not have a 
great deal of time to say, okay, guys, let's s t o p — 
n THE COURT: B u t — b u t didn't Officer Hogan 
ask him if he would submit at the hospital? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, he did. 
THE COURT: So, why is i t — w h y is the 
question of arrest an important one? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I—let me look at the 
statute, sir, I could almost swear there are some magic words 
in there. 
THE COURT: Now, if there's a question of 
arrest and what--if he refused. 
21 I MR. UPDEGROVE: On 41-6-44.10, down a t — 
THE COURT: Just a moment. 
23 I Okayl 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Down in Subparagraph 2, 
2(a), it says if a person has been placed under arrest and 
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there's been a question Joy a peace officer to submit, the--the 
forms that the officers work off— 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that say:; if he's 
been placed under arrest and has been requested, and :his has 
to do with the refusal and the effect on his driver's license. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's true. 
i 
i 
THE COURT: Mr. Long is arguing that the | 
i 
arrest is invalid. And I'm argu—I'm asking you if the arrest 
is necessary and you seem to be telling me that it is. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, I—maybe I should 
back off here and look at it a little more carefully. I see 
what your Honor is getting at. 
Let me look at 44, here. Okay. Okay. 
44-5 — 
THE COURT: What--I ask, Mr. Upd^grove, 
the question, what's the difference between this and if the 
officer decides not to make an arrest, but simply says, will 
you come down and prove to me that you're not under the 
influence? He clearly doesn't have to do, he's not under 
arrest, but if he says yes, and goes down; is that invalid? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No, sir, I guess, it 
wouldn't be. I--maybe I'm becoming a creature of pirocedure 
here. 
In looking at it, I don't—I do.Vt see 
anything that states here that requires that they b-2 arrested 
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prior to be subjected to. a test. 
THE COURT: And that's the way it normally 
is, but 1 don't know of a requirement. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, sir. And if that's 
the case, then we could argue that Mr. Passey voluntarily 
submitted to a--a blood test. And was not forced to take a 
blood test. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long? 
MR. LONG: Well, I don't know that that's 
the issue, it seems to me the issue is, he gave him the .08 
admonition, which tells him, if you don't submit to this test, 
you may lose your license to drive. So, isn't he then lying 
to the guy, he's just using this as a pretext to force him to 
take the test, instead of just coming and saying, we don't 
have any reason to—to you know, place you under arrest, but 
we're asking you if you'd voluntarily submit to a test. 
There's no--you know, if you refuse, there's no ramifications, 
gives him a choice; but to come up and say, hey, look, we're 
going to ask you to take a test, and if you refuse to take that) 
test, you're going to lose your license. That colors the 
whole choice for the defendant, doesn't it? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: When you look—I'm sorry. 
When you look at 41-6-44.10, Subparagraph 1(a) when it talks 
about the implied consent law, administered at the direction 
of a peace officer having grounds to believe that the person 
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having been operating or. in actual physical 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content 
prohibited or under the influence < 
argument, if there's any--I--I!d p 
admonition 
It's right 
THE COURT: Do 
that read to him? 
OFFICER HOGAN: 







; then my 
a copy of 
:









that it occurred, 
included in 
more by wei 






THE COURT: As I understand it, the 
him to take a blood test and then, after he 
i the admonition; is that in fact tne way 
or were the admonitions before the consent? 
OFFICER HOGAN: I'm sorry, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Was the admonition that's 
it says results indicating .08 grcjns or 
ght, was that admonition given before his consent 
s consent? 
OFFICER HOGAN: No. Then you have the 
underneath the admonition, it says, "What is your 
my rec [uest that you submit to a chemical test?" 
response. 
before-
THE COURT: Okay. So you gave the 
OFFICER HOGAN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: --he gives a yes or a no 
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answer to that request? 
OFFICER HOGAN: That's correct. j 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And procedurally, I think j 
I see, probably, why they do what they do, because of the ; 
fact they make sure they're aware that they understand if j 
they don't submit to a chemical test, then they could lose j 
their license for a year. j 
i 
MR. LONG: I believe the State vs. Cruz, j 
i 
Dick Leedy and Galen Ross took a case to the Supreme Court and 
I believe that case held the proposition that unless the | 
1 
person was placed under arrest, they could not introduce the J 
results of the chemical test, unless they established that he 
was placed under arrest first. And I believe that's why all j 
the DUI report forms have this as the first—the first require-
ment is that they—they tell him he's under arrest. 
THE COURT: I—the normal procedure is, 
you don't get somebody down to the station to take the test i 
unless"they're under arrest. I 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's right. j 
THE COURT: In this case, he wasn't going j 
anywhere. They could offer the test right where he was and j 
he could give his consent or refusal. 
I'm going to rule that the arrest per se 
is without probable cause, but I'm going to find that the test I 
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was properly done with consent, informed consent, indicating 
that he could lose his license if he did not do that. He 
indicated that he was, he was—the officer had told him he 
was under arrest, but he was not in handcuffs, was not in a 
police station, obviously was not going anywhere, and the 
police officer, obviously was not taking him anywhere at the 
moment. 
The normal aspects of coercion that are 
inherent in questioning in a police station are not present, 
it was done in the hospital, the hospital personnel around, 
if he had said no, I don't want the test taken, noth:.ng worse 
would have happened to him, there were no threats made, I 
think it was a voluntary consent. 
I'm going to deny the motion to suppress 
it because of a voluntary consent, although I find that I--
there was not probable cause for an arrest, simply upon the 
basis of an accident together with an odor of alcohol. 
So, let's see if the Court of Appeals 
agrees with me or not, but I think odor and accident is 
insufficient, and I don't think it makes a difference whether 
the accident was serious or whether it's simply a routine 
traffic stop; the odor of alcohol and a minor fender-bender 
is not enough, by itself, to arrest somebody and take them 
down to jail, it's not enough to arrest them anywhere. But I 
think the consent was given voluntarily, and therefDre, it's 
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issue of the motion to s 
Apparently they 1d found 
out in the evidentiary 1 




LONG: Maybe we should address this ! 
I 
suppress the physical evidence found. ! 
some evidence here that didn't come 1 
hearing j 





















And why--why should that be j 
I 
Well, it's not open. It's just! 
So, what—you're talking about 
Du're not talking about a motion to 1 
LONG : Well, there's no law against 







So why should I suppress it? 
Well, because it doesn't have i 
I'm going to deny the motion 
There's no evidence it was 
They're entitled to use I 
ID
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whatever they want if you donft have a reason to keep it out. 
MR. LONG: The other--the only one left, 
I guess, is the motion to suppress the officer1s testimony 
regarding the alleged indicia of intoxication, and all we 
have really, is his testimony that he smelled the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage at the foot of the — 
THE COURT: Why should that be suppressed? 
MR. LONG: --ambulance. 
Because thatfs all it is, itfs just b a r e — 
bare bones, I smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage at the 
foot of the ambulance. 
THE COURT: Okay. But that's still not a 
legal reason to suppress the testimony. 
MR. LONG: Well, I m e a n — 
THE COURT: And it may not prove—be 
enough to prove anything, but thatfs not enough—you can't 
suppress just 'cause you don': like it. 
MR. LONG: All right. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny that motion 
to suppress. 
MR. LONG: And any—since there was no 
other indicia of intoxication mentioned by either officer, 
then they won't be allowed to testify as to any at the trial? 
THE COURT: Well, Ifm not going to tell 
you that there was or wasn't, I don't know that. And I'm not 
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going to tell him what he can testify to, he's under oath to 
tell the truth. 
MR. LONG: All right. No further— 
MR. UPDEGR0V7.: Well, Larry, how about 
your officer in uniform and--
MR. LONG: Yeah. We have these procedural 
motions, do you want to rush through those? 
THE COURT: Let's do them all. 
MR. LONG: We have the one to look through 
the Court's file before proceedings commence. 























happened, since it's not 
of Evidence 
























that are not 




it may have some j 
perception of what i 
evid< 
ing • 
^nce under the Rules ; 
to deny the motion. 
u want to look through it 
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1 I'm not going to say as a matter of law that the Court file 
2 has to be submitted for your inspection; but if you want to 
3 look through it, I don't have any problem with that. 
4 MR. LONG: Okay. Fine. 
5 And then the one to have the officers 
6
 testify in their street clothes. 
7 THE COURT: Why? 
8
 MR. LONG: Well, because it just enhances 
9 their credibility, at least they think, and so they wear 
10 their uniforms to testify. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
12 MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, sometimes 
13 they're on duty and they—when they leave Court, they go on 
14 duty again. I think it would be very burdensome to put them 
15 on the requirement to put on their uniform and--or put on 
16 street clothes, testify, and go back somewhere and change 
17 into their uniform. 
IS I see nothing that would be prejudicial to 
19 the defendant's case by having the officer in uniform. He' 
20 standing up there, or sitting on the stand, saying that he's 
21 a member of the Utah Highway Patrol. What difference does it 
22 make if he's in uniform or not? And I think it would be an 
23 unnecessary burden to put on them to--
24 THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion toj 
25 compel them to appear in street clothes because Mr. Long's 
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basis for that was the o.fficer thinks it enhances his 
credibility, and that's not a reason to refuse to let him do 
it. 
MR. LONG: And then I have a motion in 
limine in allow unrestricted closing argument; I don't mean 
unrestricted, but could I have 45 minutes for a closing 
argument? 
THE COURT: If the evidence warrants it. 
It depends on what—I'm not going to give you a 45-minute 
argument on a ten-minute trial. 
MR. LONG: Well, could we then at least 
discuss it outside the presence of the jury? 
THE COURT: I've always let you do it that 
way before. 
MR. LONG: Great. And then I have a motion 
in limine to prohibit the prosecution from requesting the 
Court excuse subpoenaed witnesses and officers at the 
conclusion of their testimony, and I don't mind if they do it 
as long as the jury isn't present when they make that motion. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. LONG: Well, it makes me look like a 
schnook when I say I need them for later, or I may need them 
for later. I don't mind if he asks outside the presence of 
the jury. 
THE COURT: Oh, I don't think that 
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influences the jury one way or another, and I'm not going to 
parade the jury in and out of here after every witness to let 
you do that. 
MR. LONG: Well, we could probably— 
THE COURT: And it needs to be done on the 
record so that your objections one way or another are 
preserved. You can up to the bench and do it, I don't have 
any problem with that; but Ifm not going to parade the jury 
in and out just so that you don't look--youfre afraid that 
you don't look like a nice guy because you don't want to let 
them go. 
MR. LONG: And I have a motion in limine 
to have the Court take judicial notice of the "Know your Limit 
Blood Alcohol Content Card." 
THE COURT: To have the who take notice 
of that? 
MR. LONG: You, as judicial notice. 
THE COURT: And what is that going to do? 
It's a bench—I mean, itfs a jury trial. 
MR. LONG: That's true, yeah; but if you 
take judicial notice of it, then I don't have to lay a 
foundation for introducing it as evidence. Otherwise, I have 
to get somebody from the State over here to establish that they] 
do in fact issue these through the Department of Motor 
Vehicles and Utah Highway Patrol. 
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THE COURT: Well, judicial notice is not something 
simply that me, as an individual is aware of, but which is 
common knowledge and is legally acceptable, and I don't think 
that meets the standard. Twenty-four hour day, or 29 days 
this month or something, I'll certainly take judicial notice I 
of that; but if it's something that I know as an individual, i 
that someone else may not, then that's not properly grounds 
for judicial notice, and I'm going to deny that motion. 
MR. LONG: And then we have a motion in 
limine to prevent the arresting officer from refreshing his 
memory from the DUI report form until independent recollection 
is established, pursuant to Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to tell him 
can't—not look at his report ahead of time. 
MR. LONG: And a motion in limine to—for 
advanced ruling on grounds for objections; in other words, 
I'm just saying, could we have a little conference before the 
trial begins to establish what—what grounds we'll have for 
objecting during opening and closing arguments? 
THE COURT: You want to establish ground 
rules to object for opening and closing arguments? 
MR. LONG: Yes, uh huh. 
THE COURT. Why is this any different than] 
any other trial? 
MR. LONG: Well, I don't know that it 
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will be. I've just had difficulty in the past with prosecutin< 
attorneys and never with Mr. Updegrove or anyone from his 
office, for that matter, interrupting my opening statement so 




I'll tell them they're out of 











Well, if they get out of line, ! 
i 
line and I'm not afraid to tell ! 
t 
f line. j 
All right. 
I'm going to deny that motion, j 
I think that concludes all my ! 
Anything else? 
I believe that concludes all 
Mr. Updegrove, anything from 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No, sir. Set it for trial.! 
THE COURT: 
looks like we've bumped for th 
Is this already set? It j 
e (inaudible). \ 
Mr. Updegrove, how long will you need to 
have your witnesses noticed to be here? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, I've generally 
found two weeks are critical. 
THE COURT: Okay. Set it March 6th at | 
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9:00. Mr. Long, is that going to fit your calendar? 
MR. LONG: I have a motion hearing in the 
afternoon, but I think I can talk Judge Griffiths into bumping 
that to a new date. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm sorry. I have a — a 
felony trial starting on the 4th. 
THE COURT: Whofs going to cover this for 
you, then? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I could possibly go in to 
Friday, easily, it could be a three-day. You1re-~I understand 
what you're saying then. 
THE COURT: Is there somebody from your 
office who would handle this? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Mr. Parker handled the 
last one, I could probably get Mr. Parker to. So that would 
be March 6th. 
THE COURT: Otherwise, we're off to the 
20th, and I've got a notice in the prosecutors want to be out 
of town on that day? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The 20th? 
THE COURT: Some sort of conference. 
MR. LONG: That's the—that's the DUI 
48 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 


























A n y t h i n g e l s e , g e n t l e m e n , t h a t we n e e d t o 
d o ? 
MR. LONG: I d o n ' t b e l i e v e s o , y o u r H o n o r . 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No , s i r . 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Passey, if you'll 
see the clerk, she'll give you a notice for that. 
MR. LONG: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long, let me tell you, I 
appreciate your cutting that argument to about three hours 
shorter than normal, and that certainly will make a difference 
on the reception to the arguments. I appreciate your getting 
to the point on those. 
MR. LONG: Well, thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
50 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
conference down in St. George. 
THE COURT: Maybe Mr. Long doesn't want 
you to go to that conference before you do his trial. 
MR. LONG: Thatfs exactly right, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Do it on the 6th? 
MR. LONG: I haven't received my invita-
tion, your Honor, yet. I'm not sure he's certain about that 
day. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: March 6th, sir, at 9:00. 
THE COURT: At 9:00. 
Mr. Long, you'll discuss with Mr. Passey 
so that he understands that if you cancel this trial without 
notice the day before, I'll assess jury costs to him. So, 
Mr. Passey, you need to be in touch with your attorney, 
especially the day before, because if for some reason, the 
State makes Mr. Long or you an offer that you can't refuse, 
come in the morning set for trial and the jury is sitting 
here and you decide to accept that offer, I'll assess you the 
costs of the jurors sitting here. So, whatever decision you 
make, you need to do it at least the day before. Make sure 
Mr. Long can get in touch with you in the event that some-
thing unusual happens, and you get an offer that you think is 
to your advantage. That will save you several hundred dollars, 
if you decide to do it that way. 
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